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ABSTRACT
In this study, we analyze the evolution of poverty and inequality in Chile during a period of
continuous growth. We use data from National Socio-Economic Characterization Survey to estimate
poverty and inequality from 1990 to 2013 applying two approaches; income and multidimensional.
We use decomposition methodologies to analyze the effects of economic growth on poverty and
inequality, and the evolution of poverty and inequality by subgroups. Results show that overall
when economic growth took place, poverty and inequality decreased independently on the method
used for the analysis. Decomposition in urban and rural areas shows that people from rural sectors,
generally present lower income levels and higher rates of deprivation. Race and age decomposition
show that indigenous people and young adults, aged 18-29, display higher levels of deprivation, being
Education and Social Security the dimensions having the largest contribution to the aggregate levels
of poverty. Finally, the policy simulations suggest that a multidimensional approach can be a useful
tool to analyzed the efficiency of targeted public policies.
Keywords: Foster-Greer-Thorbecke Index, Poverty Decomposition, Multidimensional Poverty In-
dex, Multidimensional Inequality, Policy Simulations, Household surveys.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Evolution of poverty and inequalities has been a highly discussed topic in Chile in the last three
decades. In general, there is an agreement on the high reduction of poverty rates achieved by the
country since the 90’s. However, whereas some authors have claimed that this achievement on
poverty alleviation has been coupled with a reduction of income inequalities (e.g. Sapelli, 2011),
others have argued that inequalities have remained mostly unaltered (Contreras et al., 2001).
Official data (see figure A.1) shows that poverty and extreme poverty declined since 1990, with the
headcount index falling more than 30%. According to Contreras (2003), economic growth may have
accounted for 85% of the poverty reduction during 1990 to 1996, where the average Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) was 7.3%. The positive association between economic growth and the decline in
poverty rates are shown in figure A.2. When Chile started to face a more moderate economic
growth, poverty reduction shows a moderate decline as well (World Bank, 1997). For example,
while the headcount index of 1990 was 1.65 times the one of 1996, the headcount index of 1996
was 1.24 times the one of 2003 (Bravo and Valderrama, 2011). Regarding poverty decomposition,
poverty fell both in urban and rural areas, however, it remained considerably higher in rural areas
and for indigenous people. Furthermore, Agostini et al. (2008) shows that poverty trends were
widely diverse across geographic regions, with rural municipalities often being poorer than urban
ones.
Chile has not been able to reduce income inequality at the same pace than poverty. Moreover,
Chile has been among the most unequal countries in the world with the richest 20 percent of the
population holding 12 times more income than the 20 poorest percent 1. Chile ranks as the third
1Ratio of Income share held by highest 20% to Income share held by lowest 20%, with World Bank Data of 2013
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
more unequal country in Latin American only behind Brazil and Colombia, and has had the larger
Gini Index among the OECD countries.
Chile has experienced a moderate decline in income inequality since 1987. According to World
Bank (1997), the Gini index decreased from 0.55 to 0.53 between 1987-1994. Other authors suggest
that whereas income inequality decreased in the long term, there were particular periods where
inequality increased (e.g. Bravo and Valderrama, 2011). Similarly, Sapelli (2011) argues that for
cohorts born between 1902 and 1978 income inequality increase to then decrease in the long term.
Although income inequality has been declining, the high levels of income inequality coupled with
a zigzagging trend have generated the misconception that income inequality levels in Chile have
remained almost unaltered during the last 30 years.
As a consequence of some critiques arisen to the traditional measures of poverty used in Chile, the
country updated its standards in January of 2015. Chile used to define poverty regarding absolute
poverty line using the Cost of Basic Needs method. This approach establishes poverty line by an
explicit bundle of food typically consumed by the poor at local prices. On the contrary, the new
approach has incorporated a multidimensional poverty scope to complement the traditional poverty
measures; and the concept of income per adult equivalent.
The present study aims to first, review the effects of economic growth in poverty and income in-
equality. Then, similarly to Contreras (2003), we use Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposition
approach to determine the effect of economic growth on poverty by the rise of incomes and the
shift of the income distribution. Third, following Battiston et al. (2013), we compute the Multi-
dimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which includes education, health, living standards, and social
security. Fourth, we suggest a multi-attribute inequality approach that aims to be consistent with
the implementation of the MPI. Finally, we perform several micro-simulations to analyze the effect
of different public policies under the lens of the income-based and the multidimensional attribute
approaches.
The present study is structured in five chapters. The first chapter present the questions and the
contributions of the present study. The second chapter presents and describes the data used.
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Chapter three shows the methodology used to undertake these questions. The fourth chapter
provides the principal findings related to poverty, income inequality, multidimensional poverty,
multidimensional inequality, results of micro-simulations, and the limitations of the present study.
Finally, chapter five presents the mains conclusions and policy implications.
1.1 The Questions
1. Was the decline in poverty due to: a generalized rise of incomes (growth effect), government
transfers (distributional effect), or both?
A1. The poverty decline was overall due to economic growth and the shift in the income
distribution. However, the poverty decline was caused mainly by growth from 1996 to 1998,
and from 1996 to 2011.
2. What are the main issues that explain high inequality in Chile? Is there a mixed evidence
regarding income inequality trends during the analyzed period?
A2. The income inequality has remained high because the percentile 99 of income holds an
important part of the total income. Income inequality declined during the whole period but
increased during some specific periods.
3. What are the temporal trends of deprivation levels faced by the poorer sectors? Are these
levels correlated with income deprivation (poverty lines)?
A3. The deprivations levels faced by the poor decreased the 1990 to 2013 period, with
education as the dimension that contributed most to the overall index. The correlation
between dimensions of the MPI and income was relatively low.
4. Is the change on the MPI homogeneous across different geographic areas, ages, gender, and
ethnicity?
A4. The MPI does not substantially differ between gender, but a significant difference was
found by ethnicity and age ranges. The young adults and indigenous people faced higher
levels of deprivation that other groups. The Araucania, Los Rios, and Los Lagos were the
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regions facing the highest levels of deprivation.
5. What is the temporal trend of multidimensional inequality? Is this trend correlated with
Income inequality?
A5. Multidimensional inequality declined by both the uni-dimensional and the multiple
attribute index analysis. The decline in multidimensional inequality is correlated with a
decrease in income inequality.
6. What role can play the Multidimensional Poverty Index for developing public policies? What
is the effect of education and health policies on the scope this approach?
A6. MPI provides an insightful analysis for targeting public policies due to its decomposable
structure. The education and health programs caused a decline in the MPI. However, the
researchers needs to consider the assumption taken to obtain more feasible and unbiased
results.
1.2 My contributions
The present study contributes to current knowledge by updating and complementing previous re-
search related to poverty and income inequality in Chile. It also complements available information
regarding multidimensional poverty and provides a multidimensional inequality index that could
be implemented along the MPI. Results from this study contribute with insightful information that
can be used for improving the design of public policies targeting income, education, health, social
security, and dwelling characteristics according to the levels of deprivation and the opportunity
cost of each policy.
Chapter 2
Data
We use socioeconomic data for the 1990 to 2013 period taken from the National Socio-Economic
characterization survey (CASEN by its Spanish acronym). This survey is designed to collect infor-
mation at the household level and to describe socioeconomic characteristics of households including
information regarding income, levels of education, labor characteristics, dwelling characteristics,
and health. The CASEN is a cross-sectional survey that is used to evaluate government’s social
programs and fiscal expenditures. CASEN survey is conducted every two or three years by the
Microdata Center of the University of Chile 2 and supported and organized by the Ministry of
Social Development. CASEN surveys have been increasingly incorporating additional variables to
make it more robust to develop public policies.
The survey uses cluster and stratified sampling to collect information from household members
in urban and rural areas. The sampling is representative of all Chilean regions and some munic-
ipalities3. The data collected by the CASEN survey is entrusted and adjusted by ECLAC (UN
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). These data corrections are based on
missing data, miss-reported income, and under or over reported information compared to National
Accounts.
The first type of correction is related to missing data or non-responses related to people who declared
themselves as been employed but did not report any income; widows that received a pension but did
not declare it; and house owners that not declared the value of their rent. Then ECLAC performs
corrections based on average income defined by the source of income and households group, where
2Observatorio Social from Alberto Hurtado University conducted 2009 round interrupting this process
3Auto-representation at the national level, but not at different levels of decomposition
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these groups are determined by region, zone, educational attainment, and occupational sector
among others.
The second type of correction is based on under or over reported income of households. In this
case, ECLAC uses as a reference point the National Accounts System from the Central Bank to
aggregate the income flows of the households. Then, the proportional difference between both
sources of income is imputed uniformly to each CASEN’s income recipient (Contreras, 2003).
Table 2.1 summarizes the information available in each CASEN wave regarding income, education,
health, social security, and dwelling characteristics, which we use in the present study. Additionally,
the table provides information about the sample size and number of households.
Table 2.1: CASEN available information 1990-2013*
Year HHs Individuals Income** Education Health Social Security Housing
1990 25,793 105,189
1992 35,948 143,459
1994 45,379 178,057
1996 33,636 134,262
1998 48,107 188,360
2000 65,036 252,748
2003 68,153 257,077
2006 73,720 268,873
2009 71,460 246,924
2011 59,084 200,302
2013 64.842 218,491
*HHs: Households surveyed
**Autonomous Income, Cash Transfers, and Total Income of the Household
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
We use CASEN researcher’s manuals to make the sample representative of whole Chilean popula-
tion through weights and expansion provided. These manuals also provide information regarding
household and individuals income and transfer received from the government. We use the income
information at the household level to estimate poverty and inequality measures. The information
on education, health, social security and living standards from each CASEN wave is used to deter-
mine the multidimensional poverty index (MPI), the aggregate multidimensional inequality index
and microsimulations. In the next chapter, we will describe the methods here mentioned.
Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 Poverty Measures
We use the methodology developed by Foster et al. (1984), know as the P alpha family of indexes,
to estimate poverty related to income or consumption. This approach uses income information and
national poverty lines to determine the incidence of poverty. During the present study, we use the
headcount index, as well as the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap to determine the evolution
of poverty. The P0 or headcount index is widely used in Chile, and it is the official measure used
by the government to track poverty. This index uses the national poverty lines (Zi) to provides
the percentage of people which is below that cutoff. The second measure is the P1 index which
provides the income shortfall of those people situated below Zi. Thus, this methodology aggregates
the income deficits of the poor and provides an aggregate measure of the distance of ”how far” are
the poor from the selected cutoff Zi. Similarly to P1, the P2 index provides a measure of distance
from the poor people to Zi, but establishes a greater weight on those people facing a larger shortfall.
Therefore, the P2 index is more sensitive to extreme cases of the income distribution, giving greater
weight to extreme poverty (indigence).
Then the general FGT family of index can be described by the following equation
Pα =
1
n
q∑
n=1
(
z − yi
z
)α
(3.1)
7
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Poverty Decomposition
To determine if economic growth is associated with poverty reduction, we follow Datt and Ravallion
(1992) method of decomposition. This approach states that changes over poverty are caused by
a shift in the income distribution and rise or fall of household income. The method analyzes the
effects of economic growth in poverty by an income effect and a distributional effect. Therefore, this
methodology links the effect of economic growth on poverty, as the change in the poverty measure
when the Lorenz curve is held constant to a certain level Lr. Then the redistribution component
will be the change in the poverty measure when the mean income is held constant to a certain
reference level µr.
Therefore, the change over a period of time can be expressed as follow.
Pt+1 − Pt = G(t, t+ 1; r) +D(t, t+ 1; r) +R(t, t+ 1; r) (3.2)
where G(t, t+ 1; r) is growth effect, D(t, t+ 1; r) is the re-distributional effect, and R(t, t+ 1; r) is
the residual.
3.2 Inequality Measures
The Gini Index and income shares ratios are estimated to determine trends in income inequality for
the period 1990-2013. The results of these measures help to identify if income inequality increased,
decreased or remain unaltered over the period. As many researchers have claimed, income inequality
in Chile seems to have remained high and stable over the last twenty-five years. The share of the
richest 10 percent of the population to the poorest 10 percent or ratio of richest 20 percent to poorest
20 percent can provide evidence regarding income held by the different shares of the population.
However, one downside of the income share measures is that they are weakly Lorenz-consistent
(Gary Fields, 2001). Thus, a deeper analysis is needed. Therefore, we also perform a Lorenz curve
analysis following Jenkins (2008). We estimate Lorenz curve for each period based on per capita
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household income, which includes autonomous income and transfer from the government.
Additionally, we estimate the Atkinson index to support these findings. This indicator it is charac-
terized by comprising a parameter of sensitivity  for different segments of the income distribution.
Thus, this parameter could be understood as the researcher’s sensitivity to inequality, and usually
takes values of 0.5, 1, 1.5, or 2. Then, if  takes a value of 0 the researcher does not assign a
specific weight to a particular segment of the income distribution while a value of 2 gives a higher
weight to the poorest people on income distribution. Therefore a higher level  implies a higher
income inequality sensitivity, giving greater weight to those people on the lower tail of the income
distribution. Finally, we only use the Atkinson index for years 1990, 2000 and 2011 to complement
the trends in income inequality over a 9− 10 years period, and differentiating between urban and
rural areas but not at regional level.
Inequality Decomposition
To estimate the variance on inequality by subgroups, we perform an inequality decomposition by
urban and rural areas. For this we estimate the Generalized Entropy (GE) indexes or Theil’s family
of measures to determine the within and between group effect following Cowell and Jenkins (1995).
This method of decomposition allows estimating the contribution to the aggregate level of income
inequality by differences in income inequality within groups and between groups.
Then, Theil’s first measure or TheilL can be described as follows:
L = [xu ∗ Lu + xr ∗ Lr] + [xu ∗ ln(µ/µu) + xr ∗ ln(µ/µr)] (3.3)
Where xu is the fraction of the whole country population living in the urban area, and xr is the
proportion of the country’s population in the rural area. Lu and Lr are the respectively Theil’s
measure for inequality in each zone. ln(µ/µu) and ln(µ/µr) are the mean income deviation of each
area regarding to country’s average income.
Therefore, the left bracket of equation 3.3 shows the within-group component, and the right bracket
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sides the between-group component.
Equation 3.4 shows Theil’s second measure or TheilT . In the same fashion that Theil-L, the left
side of the equation shows the within group element group while the right side shows the between
group element or inequality variation.
T =
[
(
xu ∗ Tu
µ
) + (
xr ∗ Tr
µ
)
]
+
[
(
xu ∗ Tu
µ
) ∗ ln(µ/µu) + (xr ∗ Tr
µ
) ∗ ln(µ/µr)
]
(3.4)
In the present study, we perform both Theils measures, focusing in the within and between group
components to understand the effect of inequality by groups on overall inequality, and how these
inequality measures have evolved from 1990 to 2013.
3.3 Multidimensional Poverty
The multidimensional poverty analysis is conducting following the methodology developed by Alkire
Foster (AF) of the Oxford Poverty and Human Initiative (OPHI). This method establishes a de-
privation index for several dimensions or components. The AF method sets a vector z = (z1, ..., zd)
of deprivation cutoff to determine if the person i in the household h is deprived or not. Thus, if a
random person i on dimension j reach a certain cutoff zk, it can be summed that the individual i is
not deprived on dimension j. On the contrary, if the same person i on dimension j does not reach
cutoff zk, he or she will be deprived on dimension j. Additionally, this methodology establishes a
vector w = (w1, ..., wd) of weights for each dimensions.
Therefore, if all dimensions are established as equally important, w should be set as a unique
value and each dimension is added, which formally is defined as w¯ ∗∑dj=1 hj(k). On the other
hand, if dimensions are weighted differently, then dimension ji will have greater importance for the
aggregate estimation.
This approach analyzes the situation of each individual i in the household h assigning a value of 1
or ”deprived” if the individual does not meet the specific cutoff zk, and 0 or ”not deprived” if that
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level zk is reached. According to Alkire and Foster (2011) this methodology can be decomposed by
regions and different subgroups, allowing a more in deep analysis.
In this study, we include twelve sub-dimension grouped in four overall dimensions which are:
Health, Education, Dwelling characteristics, and Social Security and Employment status. These
sub-dimensions and dimensions were recommended by OPHI to the Chilean government in 2014
and are summarize in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Multidimensional Poverty Index Chile
Weight Education Health Social Security Dwelling characteristics
1/12 Educational Attainment Malnourished Employment Overcrowding
1/12 Educational underachievement Health System Coverage Retirement Savings House Components
1/12 Years of Schooling Health System Usage Retirement Income Drinking water and sanitation
Source: Ministry of Social Development, 2015
The thresholds or cutoff for each sub-dimension is established according to specific standards set
by the Ministry of Social Development and OPHI (See Annex A.2). Thus, after estimating the
levels of deprivation for each of the twelve sub-dimensions, the MPI is calculated by aggregating
the four overall dimension according to the weights settled in Table 3.1. Then the MPI will be
established according to the k cutoff that determines the particular value for which a household is
considered to be deprived. In this study, we perform the analysis for k = 25%, k = 50%, k = 75%,
and k = 100% as a way to understand the number of households deprived in only one dimension
4, in more than one, or in all four dimensions. However, the Chilean government has established
as the standard cutoff k = 25% or equivalent to be deprived in sum of one dimension. Therefore,
most of our analysis done by using this cutoff.
The aggregation of dimensions can be summarize by the following equation,
M0(X;Z) = µ(c(k)) = HxA =
q
n
∗ 1
q
q∑
i=1
ci(k) (3.5)
Where H is the traditional Headcount index, A is the intensity of poverty, and ci is the deprivation
4This means that the household could be deprived in one sub-dimension related to Education, one sub-dimension
related to Health, and one sub-dimension related to Social Security. Hence the household will be deprived if different
combination makes the household deprived in at least three of the total twelve sub-dimensions.
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score which is the weighted sum of the dimensions that are deprived (Alkire and Foster, 2011).
To increase the resolution of our analysis, we decompose the MPI by subgroup and dimensional
contribution. The subgroup decomposition includes urban and rural areas, gender, race, age cat-
egories, and geographic order while the dimensional decomposition includes the four dimensions
described as well as the twelve sub-dimensions. The description of both subgroup and dimensional
decomposition are described in the next sections.
3.3.1 MPI subgroup decomposition
According to Alkire et al. (2015), M0 can be decomposed by subgroups, estimating subgroup M0
levels and comparing with M0 aggregates levels. In the same fashion that the FGT family of
indexes, this decomposition allows understanding the within-group effect and the between group
effect regarding contributions to the aggregate MPI. Then, the overall M0 is the following,
M0(X) =
m∑
l=1
vlM0(X
l) (3.6)
Where X l is the achievement matrix of each subgroup, while vl = nl/n is the population share of
each subgroup on the overall population. Then, the contribution of each subgroup to the overall
multidimensional poverty can be summarized as,
D0l = v
lM0(X
l)
Mo(X)
(3.7)
This equation point out that the contribution of each subgroup to the aggregate level of poverty
M0(X) will depend on the population share v
l and the particular multidimensional poverty for
each subgroup M0(X
l). Therefore, the size of the subgroup considers its relative importance to the
overall levels of multidimensional poverty.
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3.3.2 MPI dimensional decomposition
Another property of the MPI is that could be decomposed according to contributions of each
dimension into to the aggregate M0. The additive structure of the MPI allows expressing the
index as a weighted sum of the censored headcount ratio ci(k). Then using the weight wj for each
dimension under analysis, M0(X) can be expressed as,
M0(X;Z) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
wjg
0
ij(k) (3.8)
Where g0ij(k) is the censored deprivation matrix which row i represents the deprivation situation of
an individual i in each of the j dimensions. Then, equation 3.8 can be reformulated into equation 3.9
to estimate the percentage contribution of each dimension to the aggregate level of multidimensional
poverty,
M0(X;Z) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
wjg
0
ij(k) =
d∑
j=1
wjhj(k) (3.9)
Equation 3.9 shows that M0 is the weighted sum of all j headcount ratios. Therefore, the contri-
bution of dimension j over M0 is denoted by φ
0
j , which is described by,
φ0j = wj
hj(k)
M0
(3.10)
Hence, the percentage contribution φ0j and the censored headcount ratio ci(k) are can be used to
analyze policy impact by subgroup.
3.4 Multidimensional Inequality
Multidimensional inequality can be understood as the inequality perceived in each particular di-
mension or as the aggregate inequality faced by an individual in multiple dimensions. Therefore,
we first analyze each of the overall four dimensions through concentration curves ordered by income
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and the Gini Index, and we compute the quintile gap for Education, which measures the differ-
ence between years schooling of the first and fifth quintile. Then, we estimate an aggregate index
of multidimensional inequality following Maasoumi (1986) and a global index of multidimensional
inequality suggested by Bourguignon (1999).
Maasoumi (1986) proposes an aggregate attribute function to estimate multi-attribute or multi-
dimensional inequality, which can be decomposed between and within groups inequality by using
additional measures such as Theil index described in section 3.2. He establishes Si =
∑N
i=1 xij as
the attribute function, where xij is the amount of attributes j = 1, ...J received by an individual
or household i = 1, ..., N . Therefore, xij denotes the row i in matrix NxJ , or in other words the
amount of attributes j received by individual i. Hence, Maasoumi suggest that relative inequality
of the population will be described by the function S = (Si, ..., SN ), and defined under Generalized
Entropy family of indexes as,
Iγ(S) =
N∑
i=1
pi
[
(S∗i /pi)
1+γ − 1] /γ(1 + γ) (3.11)
Where S∗i =
∑
j Sj and pi = 1/N is the population share of the ith unit. Then to decompose by
subgroup the Massoumi index can be extended as Theil’s first and second measures, which will be
described by,
L = I0(S) =
N∑
i=1
S∗i log(S
∗
i /pi) (3.12)
T = I1(S) =
N∑
i=1
pi log(pi/S
∗
i ) (3.13)
However, to simplify the analysis is possible to standardize each dimension or attribute j through
the following approach suggested by Jorda et al. (2014).
xij =
xji − xjmin
xjmax − xjmin
, ∀ i = 1, ...N ∧ j = 1, ..., J (3.14)
This approach allows analyzing inequalities over attributes that are within the range [0, 1] which
facilitates the process of estimating the aggregated index. Hence, we calculate multidimensional
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inequality using Maasoumi (1986) approach, but standardized the data of each dimension to simplify
the process. Then, the equation that provides the multi-attribute index for the Atkinson index can
be described as,
IMA(β, ) = 1−
[
1
N
∑N
i=1 s
1−
i
] 1
1−
µs
(3.15)
Where µs is the mean of Si and  is the inequality sensitivity or aversion to inequality.
In contrast to Maasoumi index, which estimates multidimensional inequality by stage, the global in-
dex of multidimensional inequality associate a real number to each joint distribution of the multiple
dimension under analysis.
The methodology suggested by Tsui (1995) is widely used, and assumes a social welfare func-
tion continuous, symmetric, increasing, separable, strictly quasi-concave, and scale independent.
However, we use an extension of this methodology suggested by Bourguignon (1999) who propose
more restricted parameters of the social welfare function (equation 3.16). This index regulates the
elasticity of substitution β, (restricting β ≤ 1) and the inequality aversion .
IB(β, ) = 1− 1
N
∑N
i=1
[∑J
j=1(w¯jx
β
ij)
] 
β[∑J
j=1(w¯jµ
β
j )
] 
β
(3.16)
Where w¯j is the weight of each attribute of the social welfare function, xij is the amount of
dimension j hold by person i, and µj is the mean of attribute j. Therefore, Bourguignon as well
as Massoumi index is restricted to the level of substitution of the parameters β, the weight of the
attributes on the social welfare function w, and the inequality aversion . Then, in the same fashion
than Maasoumi index, this index is increasing in , and decreasing in β.
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3.5 Public Policy Simulations
Following Gasparini et al. (2014), we compute several microsimulations through partial analysis
(equilibrium) of different public policies. This analysis allows to review the impact of a shock
or a particular policy on targeted population; we evaluate public policies related to taxes and
government transfers, education, and health.
First, similarly to Mardones (2014), we review the feasibility of implementing a progressive tax rate
and monetary subsidies as the tool for reducing income inequality in Chile. This policy simulation
aims to reduce poverty and income inequality measured by FGT, GE, and Gini Indexes. This
fiscal policy has a cost of $0 because ti works by redistributing the income between richest and
poorest people of the income distribution. We use household autonomous’s income as the base case
scenario, then the current and future tax burden and cash transfers are estimated to measure the
changes in poverty and income inequality. We simulate an additional flat rate of 10% for the richest
99% of the income distribution, where the total amount collected is distributed evenly within the
members of the poorest decile.
Second, the education policy evaluates the impact of Free Higher Education Tuition 5 in the MPI
by analyzing changes in youth’s unemployment rates. We assume that this policy should reduce the
number of student age 18-23 looking for a job due to the positive relation between unemployment
and enrollment, and the ”relative” lower opportunity cost of higher education. Therefore, we
assume a positive relation between unemployment and university enrollment, where the causality
should go from ∆+Un → ∆+Enroll (Vasigh and Hamzaee, 2004). This simulation assumes that
the higher enrollment in Universities should produce a decline in the Labor L because the students
receiving the benefit will move out from the labor force. Moreover, this policy should produce a
higher income for the first five deciles with a return to higher education of 19.5% and per capita
income of US$3, 102, on average (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). We do not perform any
simulation regarding changes over income because of the strong assumptions that should have to
5The reform was implemented in January of 2016 and benefits those families with per capita income lower than
154,166 Chilean pesos
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be taken, such as no changes in the labor markets conditions after the policy implementation.
Therefore, we prefer to focus in youth unemployment rates and their impact on the MPI.
Finally, we analyze the implementation of Health Insurance with free universal coverage for all
groups in the public health insurance system (FONASA) 6, evaluating the fiscal cost of this policy
and its effect on the MPI through a cost-benefit analysis. We assume that the health plans covers
those individuals who are self-employed and are not enrolled in any health insurance (public or
private).
6Nowadays group C and D has to make a co-payment of 10% and 20% of the cost of medical service respectively
Chapter 4
Findings
4.1 Poverty
According to the official data (Figure A.1) Chile has been experiencing a declining trend in poverty
rates since 1990. Poverty fell from 38.6% in 1990 to 7.8% in 2013. Figure A.1 shows an inverse
relation between economic growth and poverty rate, suggesting that rapid growth could produce
rapid poverty alleviation. The pre-Asian crisis (i.e. before 1998) shows the highest economic
growth, which is coupled with the highest rates of poverty decline within the analyzed period.
Poverty shows a reduction whether it is measured by the headcount index, poverty gap or squared
poverty gap. The headcount index differs from the official data, showing higher levels of poverty
between 2006-2013. Nevertheless, when poverty estimations are decomposed between urban and
rural areas, this difference tend to disappear, but remains higher than the official figures (Table
A.4). Additionally, our findings show that poverty increased during 2009, situation that is not
accounted by the Ministry of Social Development. According to Table A.4, from 2006 to 2009
poverty increase in 1.5%, but then declined from 2009 to 2011 in 0.7%.
Table A.4 indicates that poverty increased from 2006 to 2009 in 1.5%, but then declined from 2009
to 2011 in 0.7. The squared poverty gap increased during 2009 but then decreased in 2011 coming
back to the same levels reached in 2006. This situation may imply that the poorest persons of
the income distribution did not present a revenue increase during 2009 to 2011, which could be a
consequence of the relatively high unemployment rates caused by the 2009 economic crises 7. The
crisis probably produced higher unemployment on those unskilled workers who usually are located
7The unemployment rate reached over 10% between 2009-2010
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Table 4.1: Poverty in Chile for the period 1990-2013 *
Year Headcount Index Poverty Gap Index Squared Poverty Gap Index
1990 0.416 0.167 0.091
1992 0.361 0.132 0.067
1994 0.310 0.113 0.059
1996 0.263 0.093 0.047
1998 0.244 0.087 0.045
2000 0.227 0.081 0.042
2003 0.211 0.072 0.036
2006 0.157 0.050 0.024
2009 0.172 0.057 0.030
2011 0.164 0.051 0.024
2013 0.126 0.038 0.018
*Estimations without differentiating by urban and rural poverty lines.
Source: Own calculation from Casen 1990-2013
at the bottom part of the income distribution. Nevertheless, the overall trend showed by Table
4.1 and Table A.4 indicates that independently of the used measure (i.e. P0, P1 or P2) poverty
declined during 1990 to 2013.
4.1.1 Poverty decomposition
Regarding the evolution of poverty in urban and rural areas, Table A.4 shows that poverty has
been declining in both areas; however poverty rates have remained relatively higher in rural than
in urban areas. The trends in urban and rural poverty rates show a shift from 2006 to 2011 with
poverty rates increasing during 2009. The latter was characterized by a period of a more moderate
economic growth (see Table A.2 and Figure A.2 for further details) and higher poverty rates in
urban than in rural areas, which opposes to the trend observed for the rest of the analyzed period.
Similarly, the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap presented higher rural than urban poverty
rates between 2006 and 2011.
Concerning decomposition by growth and distributional effect, table A.7 shows that during 1990-
1996 both growth and distributional effect were significant to poverty alleviation. The headcount
index between 1990 and 1992 declined in 5.7%, with growth and distributional effect accounted for
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66% and 35% of the total change respectively. From 1992 to 1994 the distributional effect described
84% of the overall change while the growth effect 15%. On the other hand, the distributional effect
had a negative impact on the total change on poverty for the periods of 1996-1998, 2000-2003,
2006-2009, and 2009-2011. Thus, the poverty decomposition for this latter period suggests that the
decline in poverty was driven most of the time by the growth effect.
Finally, Table A.8 shows a negative relation between growth and distributional effect and poverty
rates for the period of 1990-1996 and 1996-2003. On the other hand, we find a positive association
between distributional effect and poverty rates during 2003-2011 while a negative relationship be-
tween growth effect and poverty rates for the same period. This situation suggests that growth effect
consistently caused a decline in poverty from 1990-2011 while the distributional effects produced a
decrease in poverty for some specific periods.
4.1.2 Poverty and government Transfers
Table A.6 compares the poverty rates based on total and autonomous income. On average, the
effect of cash transfer on the headcount index during 1990-2013 was 0.053% at a national level
while 0.051% and 0.074% in urban and rural areas respectively. This trend is also observed for
the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap. The data suggests that government transfers had
a higher impact on rural poverty than urban poverty, but with an overall positive impact. These
findings are consistent with Contreras et al. (2001), who found that government’s transfers have
had a positive effect on reducing poverty levels. However, as was shown in Table A.8, from 2006
to 2011 the distributional effect had a negative impact on poverty which suggest that government
transfers are an ineffective strategy for poverty alleviation.
4.2 Income Inequality
Income inequality shows a decline between the 1990 to 2013 period (A.3). However, a deeper
analysis of the data shows that this decline was not constant during this period. From 1990 to 1992
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income inequality shows a reduction, which is a consequence of an increase in the share of total
income held by the first fourth quintiles, and reduction of the share held by the fifth. Therefore, the
Lorenz curve of 1992 dominated the Lorenz curve of 1990. On the other hand, from 1992 to 1994
the first fourth quintiles reduced their share of total income, whereas the fifth quintile increased
its share. This is shown by the presence of Lorenz-crossing for the 1990-2013 period. Furthermore,
Figure A.3 shows the presence of Lorenz-crossing from 1990 to 1994, 1994 to 1998, 1998 to 2003,
and 2009 to 2011. Thus, the period between 2003-2009 seems to be the only period which presented
a decrease in income inequality in the within years analysis.
Regarding inequality indexes, data from Table 4.2 shows a reduction in the Gini Index of 0.73 point
during the 1990-2013 period. However, the variation of this index is not consistent across years, with
falls and rises within this periods. For example, the Gini Index declined in 0.05 between 1994 and
1996 but then increased in 0.11 by 1998. The Gini Index, the income share of p90/p10, and income
share of p75/p25 show a fall from 2000 onward, which implies that income distribution became
more equal during the period. However, the income share of p99/p10 shows that income inequality
increased between 2003 and 2011. This situation suggests that Chile’s high-income inequality is due
to the richest 99% of the population that holds a disproportionately large share of the total income.
This analysis is supported by the Table A.9, which reports a lower Gini Index when the inequality
is estimated for an income distribution that excludes the richest 99%. However this number is still
high for international standards. The Gini index from the truncated distribution shows a drop of
0.069 from 1990 to 2013. The Generalized entropy measure also shows a considerable decline in
income inequality, but inequality rose and fell during the period such as in the year 1994 and 2011.
When income inequality is analyzed by segmenting the whole period in three sub-periods defined
by average income growth of table A.2, there is Lorenz-dominance of L2003−2011  L1996−2003 
L1990−2006. Therefore, income distribution became more equal between 1990 to 2011 (Figure A.4).
During the same period, income inequality fell for the whole period and within periods. Income
inequality increased during specific periods, such as 1998 and 2000, which are years were Chile
faced economic crises (i.e. Asian crises and Dot-com bubble), but then decreased for the rest of
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Table 4.2: Income inequality in Chile by Households percapita income *
Year Income share Income share Income share GINI
p99-p10 p90-p10 p75-p25
1990 39.17 11.05 3.31 0.561
1992 42.59 10.08 3.22 0.556
1994 37.33 10.62 3.34 0.557
1996 36.03 10.98 3.41 0.552
1998 37.31 11.69 3.44 0.563
2000 34.02 11.17 3.31 0.568
2003 34.79 9.85 3.16 0.550
2006 28.39 9.14 3.05 0.524
2009 23.33 8.69 2.91 0.524
2011 27.07 8.67 2.84 0.513
2013 26.22 7.98 2.76 0.488
*Adjusted Household total income
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
the period. Therefore, this suggests that income inequality tends to increase during periods of
macroeconomic vulnerabilities.
The results from the Atkinson index for periods 1990, 2000 and 2011 (see table A.11 in the annex)
present similar evidence than those from figure A.4. These results show that income inequality
declined during 1990-2011, falling from 0.264 to 0.219. This trend remains unaltered at different
levels of inequality sensitivity, showing a consistent decrease in income inequality across sensitivity
levels. Furthermore, table A.10 also shows that income inequality decreased for both urban and
rural areas from 1990 to 2011 supporting the evidence for an overall inequality reduction during
this period.
4.2.1 Inequality and government Transfers
Table A.10 presents the effects of government transfer on income inequality. The effect of cash
transfers on the Gini Index was on average −0.013, with a higher impact during 2009-2011. This
situation shows that the consequences of government transfer on income inequality were positive
but limited, which is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Palma, 2014).
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4.2.2 Inequality decomposition
As is shown in Table A.13, the Generalized Entropy (GE) indexes suggest a within-group component
as the primary factor that explains inequality variations. This situation is supported by both Theil’s
first and second measures. However, the GE shows a different trend of income inequality between
urban and rural areas. The First Theil measure shows that income inequality was lower in rural
areas than urban areas for most of the period while Theil second measure shows a mixed trend
during the analyzed period. Theil’s second index shows that income inequality was higher in rural
areas than urban areas for 1990, 1992, 1998, 2000, and from 2006 to 2011.
Regarding Theil’s first measure, the within-group effect explains on average 96.35% of the variation
related to income inequality during the period, while the between-group component only 3.57%.
This situation suggests that variations on income inequality are explained mainly by differences
in income inequality within groups. The year 1994 showed a larger impact of the between-group
component to explain the overall inequality. However, this element only describes 7.22% of total
income inequality for this years. Similarly to Theil’s first measure, the results from Theil’s second
method showed a large effect of the within-group component, with an average effect on income
inequality of 97.2%. The between-group component explained on average only 2.81% of the total
income inequality of the period. Therefore, both Theil’s measures suggest that policies aiming to
reduce aggregate income inequality should target first the within-group income inequality.
4.3 Multidimensional Poverty
The Multidimensional poverty index (MPI) shows a similar trend than income-based poverty mea-
sures. Figure 4.1 indicates that multidimensional poverty has been falling since 1990. For example,
the percentage of the population deprived in at least three sub-dimension (k = 25% or deprived in
at least one overall dimension) was reduced from 27.7% in 1990 to 12.5% in 2013. Additionally, the
percentage of people deprived in at least six sub-dimension (k = 50%) was reduced from 9.5% in
1990 to less than 1% in 2013. Finally, the percentage of the population deprived in more than six
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sub-dimensions was almost negligible since the year 2000. (see figure A.7 and A.8 in the Annex).
Figure 4.1 show that rural zones have had higher poverty rates than urban zones, which is consis-
tent across different levels of poverty cutoff, whether K is equal to 1, 2 or 3. However, as is shown
in figure 4.1 both urban and rural areas experienced a decline in poverty rates. Rural poverty was
39.7% in 1990 decreasing to 18.4% in 2013, whereas urban poverty decreased from 24.5% in 1990
to 11.6% in 2013.
The subgroup decomposition is shown in figure A.6). Even though rural areas incidence of poverty
was higher than urban areas, its contribution to the aggregate level of poverty declined over time.
Rural contribution to the overall level of multidimensional poverty in 1990 was 24.85% while for
2013 rural’s contribution dropped to 19.69%. This lower contribution to the MPI over time is
related to lower MPI in rural areas, but also due to a shift in the population share between urban
and rural areas.
Figure 4.1: Multidimensional Poverty 1990-2013 by Area
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
Table 4.3 indicates that poverty measured by the headcount index remained high by 2013, with
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41.8% of the population deprived in at least one dimension (k = 25%). However, only 1.34% of
the Chilean population was needy in two or more dimensions by 2013. Nevertheless, the decreasing
trend in poverty rates was coupled with an increase in the percentage of people vulnerable to fell
into poverty. Indeed this percentage increased during the period from 17.9% in 1990 to 31.3% in
2013. This result reveals that a large proportion of the people that moved out of poverty were
vulnerable to fall into poverty again.
Table 4.3: MPI results at national level, decomposition between H and A
Year MPI Percentage of Intensity across Vulnerable to In severe
(HxA) poor people (H) the poor (A) Poverty (K=16.6%-25%) poverty (K=50%)
1990 27.11% 70.80% 38.29% 17.94% 17.26%
1992 25.23% 67.92% 37.15% 18.83% 14.25%
1994 22.13% 63.90% 34.63% 20.87% 8.57%
1996 22.08% 63.39% 34.82% 21.07% 9.11%
1998 21.62% 62.13% 34.79% 21.59% 8.72%
2000 22.15% 64.18% 34.51% 21.25% 8.76%
2003 18.98% 57.84% 32.81% 26.30% 4.91%
2006 15.81% 49.82% 31.73% 29.47% 3.47%
2009 14.66% 47.11% 31.11% 29.79% 2.61%
2011 14.38% 46.69% 30.80% 30.26% 2.42%
2013 12.53% 41.88% 29.92% 31.31% 1.34%
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
Regarding those people facing deprivation both by income and multidimensional approach, ta-
ble A.16 shows that the levels of correlation between the MPI and FGT(0) were relatively small.
This situation suggests that the multidimensional methodology added almost 4.5 millions of ”new”
poor at k = 1 measured by the headcount index (Table A.17). Therefore, this results provides
evidence for MPI supporters who have claimed that this multidimensional poverty methodology
allows tracking in more detail deprivations faced by the poor than the traditional Headcount in-
dex. Additionally, the MPI contributed with information regarding deprivations interconnections,
information at different levels of decomposition, and was comparable to varying levels of K (Alkire,
Sabina, 2014).
Table A.18 shows the correlations coefficients between income deprivation and the dimensions. In
general, the degree of correlation with income was small for all the analyzed dimensions, health
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presented the highest correlation (ρ = 0.14) and Dwelling Characteristics the lowest (ρ = 0.05). The
correlation matrix shows that level of correlation between the MPI dimensions was relatively small
during the period. Therefore, this situation provides evidence to support the use of a complementary
methodology to measure poverty.
4.3.1 MPI decomposition
The decomposition of the MPI by gender shows that poverty rates between male and females have
been equalizing over time, with practically the same levels of poverty for the years 2011 and 2013
(Figure A.9) However, the contribution of each group to the aggregate level shows that females
contributed slightly more than males (Figure A.10 in the annex). The female contribution has
been smoothly increasing over time due to an increase of female’s population share at almost equal
poverty rates between both genders.
Figure A.11 presents the poverty ordered by age ranges. The population under age 18 and young
adults aged 18 to 29 showed higher levels of deprivations than adults and elders. However, poverty
rates for all age groups have been decreasing since 1990. Child and young adults suffered a poverty
reduction from 28.8% and 29.9% respectively in 1990 to 13.6% and 13.7% in 2013. Nevertheless, the
contribution by age group to the aggregate level of poverty shows that the child group has reduce
their proportion in the aggregate poverty levels while adults and elders have increased (Figure A.12
in the Annex). These results can be a consequence of the shift of Chile’s demographic composition.
The race decomposition is shown in figure A.13. This chart indicates that indigenous popula-
tion had a higher incidence of poverty than non-indigenous population, with deprivation rates of
16.4% and 12.2% respectively in 2013. However, deprivations levels of indigenous people have been
declining from 1996 8 with an overall reduction of 15.6% since 1996. Figure A.14 shows that con-
tribution of indigenous people to the aggregate levels of poverty M0, has been increasing during
1996-2013, which can be related to higher levels of multidimensional poverty, and an increment of
the proportion of the indigenous population (Table A.19).
8Casen rounds of 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1998 do not present information related to the race of the households
CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS 27
The regional decomposition is shown in figure A.15. The poverty rates decreased in all regions since
1990, with poverty rates below 14% in all Chilean regions in 2013. La Araucania, Los Lagos, and
Los Rios regions have been constantly the areas facing relatively higher levels of deprivation. The
Metropolitan was the region with higher contribution to the aggregate levels of poverty followed
by Bio-Bio, and Valparaiso, which is expected as these regions, concentrate the largest population
in the country (Figure A.16).
4.3.2 Dimensional breakdown
The contribution of each dimension to the aggregate level of M0 is shown in figure A.17. Education
was the aspect having the largest contribution to the overall multidimensional poverty, followed by
social security, health and living standards. Education average contribution to the aggregate level
of poverty M0 during the period was 49.4% while social security 23.4%, health 13.2%, and dwelling
characteristics 13.8%.
Figure A.18 indicates that educational attainment and years of schooling are the sub-dimensions
that had the largest contribution to the aggregate index, while the contribution of health insurance
to overall deprivation has been diminishing, as well as access to drinking water and sanitation. The
contribution of pensions to the MPI rose since 1990. These variations in dimensions contribution
to the MPI could be explained by relatives changes over the respective headcount ratios hj(k)
over time because the weights wj have remained constant. Finally, the negative trend on health
insurance could be related to ”AUGE” health policy implemented during 2002-2003.
4.4 Multidimensional Inequality
Figure A.19 shows that the distribution of year of schooling by income quintiles has become almost
as equal in the quintiles one to fourth. Furthermore, the two poorest quintiles were reaching higher
levels of education since 2006, and the 75% percentile of the first two quintiles were facing similar
levels of schooling than quintiles three and four. Additionally, the quintile gap, which measures
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the difference of years of education of quintile one and five, shows that educational gap declined
significantly since 2006. However by 2013, there was a large difference between years of schooling
between quintile five and the rest quintiles. Whereas the fifth quintile presented a median of 12
years of education while the others quintiles ranged between 8 to 10 years.
Figure A.20 shows the concentration curves for years 1990, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2009, and 2013. These
curves suggest small differences on schooling distribution across population ordered by income, but
schooling distribution did not become more equal during the period. The concentration curves
of the 90’s decade show the same pattern than those from the 2000’s. Similarly, the Gini index
for years of schooling suggests a declining trend over time, however with periods of increasing
and decreasing inequalities (Table A.20). For example, the Gini index increased between 1992
and 1994, and between 2003 and 2006, but those increases were relatively small, and the overall
tendency supports a reduction of inequalities. The analysis between urban and rural areas indicates
a declining trend of educational inequality for both urban and rural areas. During the 1990 - 2013
period there was an increment on years of schooling of 2 years, and the Gini index declined in
0.04. This situation suggests that even though inequality has been falling, still exist some room for
making educational distribution more equal across quintiles.
Regarding Health, figure A.21 shows a reduction in inequalities measured by concentration curves.
Health insurance distribution became more equal between 1990 and 1996. Indeed, since 1996 the
access to health insurance has shown similar levels of access to universal health care for all the
population. This situation could be related to the implementation of AUGE Health Care 9 and
Fonasa A and B, which targets health assistance for the poorest sectors of the population.
Figure A.22 shows that enrollment in the retirement pension system10 has become more equal,
with wealthy and poor sectors having access to a retirement plan. However, this system does not
guaranty an equitable pension amount. In this regards Table A.21, the Gini index for a social
security index integrating employment condition, enrollment in the retirement system, and the
amount of pension shows that inequality has remained constant ranging between 0.857 and 0.899.
9Universal health coverage for specific diseases such as cancer or diabetes
10Administradoras de Fondos (AFP) system in Chile
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However, the Social Security and employment conditions shows that inequality has increased, with
the Gini index growing from 0.098 to 0.108. The decomposition between urban and rural areas
shows that inequality was higher in rural areas than urban areas from 1990 to 2013. These inequality
differences were in the range of 0.031 on average, but the gap between urban and rural inequality
decreased over time.
Figure A.23 presents the concentration curves for dwelling characteristics. Dwelling characteristics
distribution became more equal over time, with poorest and richest quintiles presenting similar
dwelling characteristics. The living standards index at the country level increased from 0.845 in
1990 to 0.951 in 2013, which was coupled with a reduction of the Gini index from 0.125 to 0.042
(Table A.22). These trends were found both for urban and rural areas, which could be caused by
improvements in living standards due to public housing policies implemented by the government.
Table A.23 presents the results for multidimensional inequality by the Maasoumi index. Results
from this index show that overall multidimensional inequality decreased at different levels of elas-
ticity of substitution and inequality aversion. Similarly to Maasoumi results, Bourguignon index
shows that overall multidimensional inequality declined at the various levels of β and  (Table
A.24). These suggest that inequality seems to be higher at higher levels of inequality aversion and
lower elasticity substitution between attributes (column fourth Table A.24).
Both methodologies show that multidimensional inequality significantly declined during 1990-2013.
Nevertheless, multidimensional inequality increased between 1994-1996. The trends for some par-
ticular specification of Maasoumi Atkinson index and Bourguignon index show that between 1990
and 1994 multidimensional inequality declined in three of the fourth specification (Figure A.23).
Then, from 1994 to 1996 there was a slight increase. After 1996 multidimensional inequality con-
tinuously declined, showing low levels ranging between 0.1 and 0.07. Hence, these two approaches
show that consistently with multidimensional poverty, multidimensional inequality has been falling
as well.
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4.5 Policy Simulations
The tax reform simulations are shown in figures A.25 and A.26, with a tax flat rate of 10% over the
percentile 99 of the income distribution. This fiscal policy simulation slightly reduced the aggregate
poverty (measured by the headcount index) but had a significant impact on the poverty gap and
the squared poverty gap. The fiscal policy simulation had a larger impact on rural than in urban
areas. Furthermore, table A.26 shows that the tax policy was able to reduce the aggregate levels
of income inequality from 1990-1998. Similarly, the fiscal policy caused a fall of income inequality
in rural areas that could be explained by the government transfers.
This situation suggests that the structure of the tax reform matters. A more progressive tax reform
could be useful only if can target those groups more deprived. Moreover, the opportunity cost of
this policy is an additional factor that needs to be taken into account, which is particularly relevant
for Chile as the country already implemented a progressive tax structure, with richer people facing
tax rates around 40%.
Thus, even though this policy simulation reduced aggregate poverty, and poverty and income
inequality in rural areas, the overall effect could be considered not important. This result is consis-
tent with previous findings, showing that tax reform and social programs are not efficient to reduce
poverty and income inequality (Borzutzky, 2012). However or results lack a General equilibrium
analysis and the effects of higher taxes on labor market conditions, savings, and investments. There-
fore, it is likely that a higher tax rate could produce a decline in wages, and a contraction of private
inversion (Mardones-Poblete, 2011). This dynamic was left constant under this analysis.
The education policy simulation had an effect on the MPI reducing deprivation on young employ-
ment. Figure A.25 shows that the levels of deprivations were lower in the scenario with the policy
than without the policy. The M0 declined on average in 0.32% at the national scale, 0.34% for
urban areas and 0.23% for rural areas. Additionally, the subgroup contribution to aggregate levels
of poverty changed (Figure A.26). This shift was explained mainly by the relatively higher M0.
Although the policy had a positive impact, the changes on M0 and D0 due to the policy may be
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considered small every time that the fiscal cost per year of the educational plan was around 402.71
million dollars (Salas et al., 2014). Hence, from a policy perspective this policy did not have a
significant impact on reducing multidimensional poverty, however in the long term should have a
positive impact on income and years of schooling.
Finally, the analysis for the FONASA policy simulation is more straightforward because this plan
aims to reduce the co-payment made by families with Fonasa C and D, from 10% and 20% 11
respectively to $0. As is shown in figure A.27 the policy had an important impact on years 1990
and 1992. Then from 1994 to 2013 the policy had a moderate effect on poverty. The differences in
poverty rates between the base scenario and the policy scenario were 5.35% between 1990 to 1992,
but then decreased to 1.69% between 1994 to 2013.
Regarding decomposition between urban and rural areas, Figure A.28 shows that urban contribution
to aggregate levels increased while rural contribution decreased. Although there was a significant
impact on poverty, the high expected fiscal cost per year of 4, 708, 000, 00012 makes difficult to
implement the policy due its high opportunity cost. Regarding the cost-benefit analysis, this plan
presents ”red” numbers when analyzing the impact on multidimensional poverty.
11AUGE diseases are covered 100% by the government on public hospitals
12Estimation based on the annual health benefits and the cost of those. Furthermore, this is associated with 10.95%
of the population on Fonasa C, and 7.3% in Fonasa D, and median of 19 health benefit per person, and cost per
benefit of US$80 on average. This cost is estimated related to public hospital or institution.
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4.6 Limitations
As was mentioned in chapter two, incomes from CASEN survey are submitted to corrections of
the ECLAC to entrust them. Therefore, some authors have argued that income adjustments could
affect revenues from the job, government transfers, and implicit rent. Although these corrections
could generate a bias, the methodology used to perform those adjustment has not changed over
time (Contreras, 2003). However, even though we were aware that income levels can be affected
by these corrections and the highest wages of the income distribution are not reflected in CASEN
(Bravo and Valderrama, 2011), we considered that this situation had a small impact in our study,
because we focused mainly on the rate of changes. Hence, the results reported in this study should
be able to grasp an accurate picture of the evolution of these measures from 1990 to 2013.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The first goal of this study was to contribute to current knowledge by updating and complementing
previous research related to poverty and inequality in Chile. The second was to suggest a multi-
dimensional inequality index to conduct along with the newly adopted Multidimensional Poverty
Index. Finally, the third goal was to determine the advantage of using the MPI and the income-
based approaches to test the effectiveness of analyzed public policies.
Our results show that poverty measurements show a decline in both income and multidimensional
approach, with a substantial decrease during periods of high economic growth. In addition, poverty
decomposition suggests that poverty declined during 1990-2006 by both an increase in income and
because income distribution became more equal while during 2006-2013 mainly by growth effect.
Regarding income inequality, we found similar results to those of previous researchers who report
mixed trends of inequality during 1990-2013. Income inequality experienced an overall decrease
from 1990-2001, but Lorenz curves were crossing within the analyzed period. The inequality de-
composition shows a within-group inequality as the primary factor to explain the overall income
inequality while between-group inequality was relatively small. This situation suggests that pub-
lic policies should focus on within-group (urban-urban or rural-rural) inequality to reduce overall
income inequality.
Also, the newly adopted Multidimensional Poverty Index added almost 4.5 million of ”new poor”
to the traditional measures used by the Chilean government to track poverty (Headcount index).
This result suggests that the MPI allowed to understand poverty in more detail than the traditional
income measures, and establish a new baseline to talk about poverty. Furthermore, the low levels
of correlation between income and the selected dimensions, suggest that incorporating the MPI to
33
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complement poverty measures is a useful approach to determine overall poverty condition in Chile.
Further studies should consider the possibility of incorporating income as an MPI dimension and
analyze the outcomes at several levels of poverty (k), weights (w), and different cutoff (z) for
each particular dimension. For example, in the present study Education was the aspect that had
the largest contribution to the aggregate levels of M0, followed by Social Security, Health, and
Dwelling characteristics. Therefore, policies aimed to increase the levels of educational attainment
and years of schooling could be an effective strategy to alleviate overall levels of poverty. However,
these policies will have a long-term effect because these dimensions are highly associated with a
population that already moved to the labor force. Therefore, the policies should aim the population
that are currently studying at schools and increase their likelihood to reach the education cutoff.
Chile should adopt a multidimensional attribute approach to be used along with the MPI. A
multidimensional inequality approach focuses on an individual attribute and multiple attributes and
provides robust results for estimating multidimensional inequality. Maasoumi and Bourguignon’s
indexes allow setting different levels of elasticity of substitution β and inequality aversion  that
could be useful for analyzing the evolution of inequality over time and by the various dimensions
included in the MPI. Future studies may also focus on analyzing multidimensional inequality by
decomposing between urban and rural areas, every time that these type of indexes are defined
under GE family of measures. Information from these analyses could provide insightful geographical
information for prioritizing fiscal resources.
Finally, the microsimulations offer an insightful analysis, suggesting that a multidimensional scope
can be a useful tool for targeting public policies. However, the applicability of the analysis will
depend on the objectives of each policy and the assumptions taken. Nevertheless, the decomposition
structure of the MPI could be useful for analyzing different aspects of public policies that could
affect incomes and several dimensions of the index.
The possibility to decompose by gender, race, age ranges, or municipalities allow to analyze the
efficiency of the newly implemented Registro Social de Hogares and the former Ficha de Proteccion
Social and CAS to target public policies. These forms have been used by the Ministry of Social
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Development since 1987, but experts have criticized them because these surveys have excluded poor
people from social programs benefits while some nonpoor people have been benefited. Hence, the
MPI and the Multidimensional inequality index could be used to analyze the Registro Social de
Hogares as a mechanism to target poverty alleviation and inequality policies, and also its impact
by comparing it to the former mechanisms for targeting social policies.
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Annex
A.1 Past evidence
Figure A.1: Poverty trends 1990-2013
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Table A.2: GDP Average Growth and Poverty , 1990-2013
∆1990− 1996 ∆1996− 2003 ∆2003− 2011
Headcount Index −15.4% −4.5% −2.8%
GDP average 7.3% 4.8% 3.1%
Source: World Bank IBRD-IDA
Table A.3: Income distribution in Chile by Quantile, 1990-2013
Year 1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 5th Q
1990 3.36 6.56 10.32 17.30 62.46
1992 3.85 7.17 10.98 17.86 60.14
1994 3.46 6.73 10.59 17.73 61.50
1996 3.65 7.06 10.97 18.22 60.10
1998 3.51 6.94 10.85 18.02 60.68
2000 3.68 7.06 10.93 17.79 60.55
2003 3.82 7.24 11.07 17.74 60.12
2006 4.24 7.86 11.81 18.65 57.43
2009 4.30 7.95 11.74 18.33 57.68
2011 4.52 8.20 11.86 18.42 56.99
2013 4.63 8.29 12.05 18.33 56.69
Source: World Bank IBRD-IDA
A.2 Multidimensional Poverty Cutoff
A. Education
1. Educational Attainment
• Household’s member within age 4 − 18 is deprived if he/she is not attending to school
and has not graduated yet.
• Household’s member within age 6− 26 is deprived if he/she has not attended to school
for an extended period(permanent absence).
2. Educational Underachievement
• Household’s member 21 years old or younger is deprived if he/she is at least two years
below his/her corresponding school level.
3. Years of Schooling
• Household’s member 18 years or older is deprived if has not met the minimum years of
schooling. This means that Household’s member is deprived if Schooling < 12
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B. Health
1. Malnourished1
• Household’s member within age 0− 6 is deprived if they are malnourished. This means
that child will be deprived if weight ≤ −2 S.D.
• Household’s member older than 6 years old will be malnourished if Adultbmi < 18.5
2. Health System Coverage
• Household’s member is deprived if does not have any health insurance, neither public or
private (Fonasa o Isapre) or any other private insurance.
3. Health System Usage
• Household’s member is deprived if he/she suffered a problem in the last 3 months and
did not receive treatment, or
• Household’s member is deprived if he/she in the last 12 months has been receiving health
treatment but have not been covered by the health system’s warranty.
C. Social Security
1. Unemployment
• Household’s member older than 18 years old is deprived if unemployed and is looking
for a job, and he/she is not studying.
2. Social Security
• Household’s members older than 15 years old is deprived if he/she is working but is not
subscribed to a retirement plan.
3. Retirement System
• Household’s members older than 60 years old for women or 65 years old for men is
deprived if he/she does not receive any income from his/her retirement saving or any
other income such as rent, dividends, or interests.
D. Dwelling Characteristics
1. Overcrowding
• The household will be deprived if the Household’s members sharing a room is higher
than 2.5 on average per room in the household.
2. House Components
1These are standards suggested by World Health Organization
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• The household is deprived if house’s floor, walls, or roof are in bad shape. or
• The household is deprived if house’s floor, walls, or roof present low-quality materials.
3. Drinking water and Sanitation
• The household is deprived if house does not have access to a high-quality source of
drinking water, or
• The Household is deprived if the house does not have access to sewer.
A.3 Figures and Tables
Figure A.2: Poverty and Gross National Income evolution
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Table A.4: Poverty in Chile 1990-2013 by Zone*
Year Zone FGT0 FGT1 FGT2
Country 0.383 0.148 0.079
1990 Urban 0.382 0.148 0.079
Rural 0.386 0.147 0.080
Country 0.326 0.114 0.056
1992 Urban 0.324 0.115 0.057
Rural 0.337 0.111 0.052
Country 0.274 0.097 0.049
1994 Urban 0.268 0.095 0.049
Rural 0.308 0.103 0.051
Country 0.232 0.078 0.038
1996 Urban 0.219 0.074 0.036
Rural 0.303 0.101 0.049
Country 0.215 0.074 0.037
1998 Urban 0.205 0.071 0.036
Rural 0.274 0.090 0.043
Country 0.201 0.069 0.036
2000 Urban 0.195 0.067 0.035
Rural 0.237 0.082 0.043
Country 0.186 0.062 0.031
2003 Urban 0.184 0.062 0.031
Rural 0.199 0.064 0.032
Country 0.136 0.043 0.021
2006 Urban 0.139 0.044 0.021
Rural 0.122 0.038 0.019
Country 0.151 0.050 0.026
2009 Urban 0.154 0.051 0.027
Rural 0.129 0.046 0.025
Country 0.144 0.045 0.021
2011 Urban 0.149 0.046 0.022
Rural 0.107 0.035 0.018
Country 0.108 0.033 0.015
2013 Urban 0.107 0.031 0.014
Rural 0.115 0.043 0.023
*Estimations based on percapita Household income
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
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Table A.5: Poverty in Chile 1990-2013 by Zone and Autonomous Income *
Year Zone FGT0 FGT1 FGT2
Country 0.437 0.184 0.105
1990 Urban 0.438 0.185 0.105
Rural 0.435 0.180 0.105
Country 0.378 0.148 0.080
1992 Urban 0.375 0.148 0.080
Rural 0.391 0.146 0.077
Country 0.323 0.126 0.070
1994 Urban 0.313 0.123 0.069
Rural 0.374 0.140 0.076
Country 0.287 0.108 0.059
1996 Urban 0.272 0.101 0.055
Rural 0.373 0.146 0.081
Country 0.269 0.107 0.061
1998 Urban 0.255 0.100 0.057
Rural 0.358 0.148 0.087
Country 0.257 0.100 0.058
2000 Urban 0.249 0.096 0.055
Rural 0.309 0.126 0.075
Country 0.243 0.094 0.055
2003 Urban 0.236 0.090 0.052
Rural 0.290 0.122 0.075
Country 0.187 0.071 0.042
2006 Urban 0.185 0.069 0.040
Rural 0.202 0.088 0.058
Country 0.222 0.093 0.059
2009 Urban 0.220 0.089 0.056
Rural 0.238 0.117 0.085
Country 0.208 0.082 0.050
2011 Urban 0.210 0.081 0.047
Rural 0.197 0.094 0.066
Country 0.138 0.046 0.023
2013 Urban 0.135 0.043 0.021
Rural 0.155 0.062 0.038
*Estimations based on percapita Household income
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
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Table A.6: Transfers effects over Poverty of Total and Autonomous Income *
Year Zone ∆ FGT0 ∆ FGT1 ∆ FGT2
Country -0.054 -0.036 -0.026
1990 Urban -0.056 -0.037 -0.026
Rural -0.049 -0.033 -0.025
Country -0.052 -0.034 -0.024
1992 Urban -0.051 -0.033 -0.023
Rural -0.054 -0.035 -0.025
Country -0.049 -0.029 -0.021
1994 Urban -0.045 -0.028 -0.020
Rural -0.066 -0.037 -0.025
Country -0.055 -0.030 -0.021
1996 Urban -0.053 -0.027 -0.019
Rural -0.070 -0.045 -0.032
Country -0.054 -0.033 -0.024
1998 Urban -0.050 -0.029 -0.021
Rural -0.084 -0.058 -0.044
Country -0.056 -0.031 -0.022
2000 Urban -0.054 -0.029 -0.020
Rural -0.072 -0.044 -0.032
Country -0.057 -0.032 -0.024
2003 Urban -0.052 -0.028 -0.021
Rural -0.091 -0.058 -0.043
Country -0.051 -0.028 -0.021
2006 Urban -0.046 -0.025 -0.019
Rural -0.080 -0.050 -0.039
Country -0.071 -0.043 -0.033
2009 Urban -0.066 -0.038 -0.029
Rural -0.109 -0.071 -0.060
Country -0.064 -0.037 -0.029
2011 Urban -0.061 -0.035 -0.025
Rural -0.090 -0.059 -0.048
Country -0.030 -0.013 -0.008
2013 Urban -0.028 -0.012 -0.007
Rural -0.040 -0.019 -0.015
*Estimations based on percapita Household income
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
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Table A.7: Poverty Decomposition*
1990% 1992% Total Change Growth Effect Distribution Effect Residual
Headcount Index 38.34 32.62 -5.71 -3.81 -2.04 0.14
Poverty Gap 14.83 11.48 -3.35 -1.75 -1.61 0.01
1992% 1994% Total Change Growth Effect Distribution Effect Residual
Headcount Index 32.62 27.47 -5.15 -0.68 -4.35 -0.11
Poverty Gap 11.48 9.70 -1.77 -0.31 -1.50 0.04
1994% 1996% Total Change Growth Effect Distribution Effect Residual
Headcount Index 27.47 23.08 -4.38 -3.57 -1.09 0.28
Poverty Gap 9.70 7.81 1.89 -1.42 -0.48 0.01
1996% 1998% Total Change Growth Effect Distribution Effect Residual
Headcount Index 23.08 21.56 -1.51 -3.00 1.44 0.04
Poverty Gap 7.81 7.44 -0.37 -1.17 0.83 -0.03
1998% 2000% Total Change Growth Effect Distribution Effect Residual
Headcount Index 21.56 20.11 -1.45 -1.32 -0.10 -0.02
Poverty Gap 7.44 6.97 -0.47 -0.49 0.18 0.05
2000% 2003% Total Change Growth Effect Distribution Effect Residual
Headcount Index 20.11 18.57 -1.53 1.07 -2.48 -0.12
Poverty Gap 6.97 6.26 -0.70 0.38 -1.05 -0.04
2003% 2006% Total Change Growth Effect Distribution Effect Residual
Headcount Index 18.57 13.68 -4.88 -3.19 -1.55 -0.13
Poverty Gap 6.26 4.34 -1.92 -1.17 -0.84 0.09
2006% 2009% Total Change Growth Effect Distribution Effect Residual
Headcount Index 13.68 15.11 1.42 -2.59 4.58 -0.56
Poverty Gap 4.34 5.06 0.72 -0.81 1.78 -0.25
2009% 2011% Total Change Growth Effect Distribution Effect Residual
Headcount Index 15.11 14.42 -0.68 -1.66 1.09 -0.11
Poverty Gap 5.06 4.51 -0.55 -0.52 0.03 -0.06
2011% 2013% Total Change Growth Effect Distribution Effect Residual
Headcount Index 14.42 10.88 -3.54 -2.95 -0.45 -0.14
Poverty Gap 4.51 3.33 -1.17 -0.96 -0.24 0.034
*Estimations based in real per capita income and results are shown over the base year
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
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Table A.8: Poverty Decomposition by 1990, 1996, 2003, and 2011 *
1990% 1996% Total Change Growth Effect Distribution Effect Residual
Headcount Index 38.34 23.08 -15.26 -8.42 -7.77 0.93
Poverty Gap 14.83 7.81 -7.02 -3.78 -3.89 0.65
1996% 2003% Total Change Growth Effect Distribution Effect Residual
Headcount Index 23.08 18.57 -4.50 -3.27 -1.15 -0.07
Poverty Gap 7.81 6.26 -1.55 -1.27 -0.36 0.07
2003% 2011% Total Change Growth Effect Distribution Effect Residual
Headcount Index 18.57 14.42 -4.14 -7.35 5.55 -2.34
Poverty Gap 6.26 4.51 -1.75 -2.51 1.54 -0.79
*Estimations based in real per capita income and results are shown over the base year
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
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Figure A.4: Inequality Comparisons: 1990, 1996, 2003, and 2011
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Table A.9: Income inequality in Chile with truncated income distribution*
Year GE(0) GE(1) Gini
1990 0.438 0.454 0.497
1992 0.418 0.442 0.490
1994 0.423 0.447 0.491
1996 0.411 0.419 0.482
1998 0.405 0.416 0.479
2000 0.397 0.405 0.472
2003 0.380 0.395 0.465
2006 0.339 0.345 0.440
2009 0.305 0.303 0.414
2011 0.308 0.305 0.421
2013 0.335 0.316 0.428
*Truncated analysis of income distribution
at historically 99%
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
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Table A.10: Income inequality in Chile by Zones and sensitivity to inequality*
Year Zone A(0.5) A(1) A(2)
1990 All 0.264 0.432 0.678
1990 Urban 0.244 0.404 0.648
1990 Rural 0.296 0.455 0.662
2000 All 0.234 0.388 0.620
2000 Urban 0.225 0.377 0.617
2000 Rural 0.230 0.372 0.590
2011 All 0.219 0.367 0.574
2011 Urban 0.198 0.337 0.551
2011 Rural 0.204 0.335 0.536
*Analysis by zone does not include the weights
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
Table A.11: Income inequality in Chile without government transfers
Year Income share p90-p10 Income share p75-p25 GINI ∆ Ginitot−aut *
1990 10.22 3.30 0.572 -0.011
1992 9.47 3.26 0.567 -0.011
1994 10.08 3.34 0.569 -0.012
1996 10.28 3.31 0.557 -0.005
1998 10.51 3.31 0.578 -0.015
2000 9.66 3.14 0.583 -0.015
2003 9.18 3.11 0.566 -0.016
2006 9.01 3.04 0.539 -0.015
2009 8.68 3.03 0.545 -0.021
2011 8.47 2.98 0.534 -0.021
2013 7.80 2.85 0.495 -0.007
*Comparing Total Income with autonomous Income
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
Table A.12: Income inequality in Chile by HHs earnings
Year Income share p90-p10 Income share p75-p25 GINI
1990 9.69 3.51 0.545
1992 10.39 3.54 0.556
1994 10.57 3.63 0.552
1996 11.61 3.33 0.548
1998 11.16 3.44 0.547
2000 10.06 3.32 0.552
2003 9.70 3.40 0.543
2006 9.16 3.22 0.511
2009 7.96 3.18 0.502
2011 7.99 3.18 0.504
2013 8.00 2.10 0.471
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Table A.13: Inequality descomposition 1990-2013 by subgroup k*
Year Zone GE(0) GEW (0) GEB(0) GE(1) GEW (1) GEW (1)
Country 0.548 0.543 0.005 0.673 0.668 0.004
1990 Urban 0.518 - - 0.618 - -
Rural 0.607 - - 0.831 - -
Country 0.548 0.523 0.025 0.687 0.663 0.023
1992 Urban 0.544 - - 0.661 - -
Rural 0.483 - - 0.671 - -
Country 0.540 0.501 0.039 0.756 0.719 0.036
1994 Urban 0.540 - - 0.764 - -
Rural 0.434 - - 0.582 - -
Country 0.499 0.472 0.026 0.589 0.565 0.024
1996 Urban 0.486 - - 0.569 - -
Rural 0.434 - - 0.548 - -
Country 0.525 0.502 0.022 0.662 0.640 0.021
1998 Urban 0.519 - - 0.631 - -
Rural 0.462 - - 0.675 - -
Country 0.491 0.471 0.020 0.609 0.589 0.019
2000 Urban 0.474 - - 0.570 - -
Rural 0.466 - - 0.632 - -
Country 0.494 0.473 0.021 0.638 0.617 0.020
2003 Urban 0.498 - - 0.629 - -
Rural 0.432 - - 0.588 - -
Country 0.443 0.432 0.011 0.556 0.545 0.011
2006 Urban 0.432 - - 0.526 - -
Rural 0.431 - - 0.586 - -
Country 0.383 0.374 0.008 0.454 0.445 0.008
2009 Urban 0.380 - - 0.445 - -
Rural 0.362 - - 0.447 - -
Country 0.418 0.411 0.007 0.497 0.490 0.006
2011 Urban 0.412 - - 0.482 - -
Rural 0.408 - - 0.534 - -
Country 0.418 0.406 0.011 0.462 0.451 0.010
2013 Urban 0.403 - - 0.448 - -
Rural 0.416 - - 0.467 - -
*Estimations based on percapita Household income
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
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Table A.14: Summary statistics of Household dimensions, 1990-2013
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
HH depattend 2193743 0.814 0.389 0 1
HH lagschool 2193743 0.114 0.318 0 1
HH notgraduated 2193743 0.797 0.402 0 1
HH malnourished 2193743 0.076 0.265 0 1
HH Health ins 2193743 0.186 0.389 0 1
HH healthaccess 2193743 0.072 0.258 0 1
HH Unemployment 2193743 0.114 0.318 0 1
HH LifeIns 2193743 0.327 0.469 0 1
HH RetInc 2193743 0.216 0.411 0 1
HH Room 2193743 0.149 0.356 0 1
HH HouseCon 2193743 0.105 0.306 0 1
HH BasicFacilities 2193743 0.252 0.434 0 1
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
Figure A.5: Multidimensional Poverty Dimensions 1990-2013
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Table A.16: Correlation of Headcount index and MPI
Year ρ FGT (0) MPI(H) Pop.
1990 0.232∗ 38.3% 70.8% 12,957,503
1992 0.213∗ 32.6% 67.9% 13,458,623
1994 0.226∗ 27.4% 63.9% 13,894,631
1996 0.206∗ 23.2% 63.4% 14,386,031
1998 0.195∗ 21.5% 62.1% 14,765,419
2000 0.179∗ 20.1% 64.2% 15,112,659
2003 0.162∗ 18.6% 57.8% 16,639,785
2006 0.150∗ 13.6% 49.8% 16,152,353
2009 0.144∗ 15.1% 47.1% 16,607,007
2011 0.142∗ 14.4% 46.7% 16,962,515
2013 0.196∗ 10.8% 41.9% 17,273,117
Note: MPI counted as headcount index by K=1
* 99% of significance.
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
Table A.17: Distribution of Poor People by methodology, Headcount Index and MPI*
Methodology 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 2009 2011 2013
FTG(0)-MPI(H) 42.62% 36.62% 33.05% 28.22% 27.46% 25.35% 22.99% 18.51% 19.33% 18.43% 23.41%
FTG(0) 7.48% 7.71% 6.95% 6.00% 5.38% 4.56% 6.91% 7.03% 9.65% 9.52% 14.10%
MPI(H) 49.90% 55.67% 60.00% 65.78% 67.16% 70.09% 70.10% 74.46% 71.02% 72.04% 62.49%
*MPI estimated by Headcount index
Source: Own elaboration with Casen
Table A.18: Correlation Matrix between income and MPI dimensions
Income Education Health Social Security Dwelling Characteristics
Income 1
Education 0.0968∗ 1
Health 0.1376∗ 0.1308∗ 1
Social Security 0.0550∗ 0.2657∗ 0.1094∗ 1
Living Standards 0.0509∗ 0.2295∗ 0.0479∗ 0.2557∗ 1
* Significance at 99% of confident
Source: Own elaboration with Casen
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Figure A.6: M0 decomposition by subgroup, Urban and Rural
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
Figure A.7: Multidimensional Poverty 1990-2013 by Zone
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Figure A.8: Multidimensional Poverty 1990-2013 by Zone
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Figure A.9: Multidimensional Poverty 1990-2013 by Sex
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
Figure A.10: M0 decomposition by subgroup, Male and Female contribution
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Figure A.11: Multidimensional Poverty 1990-2013 by Age
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
Figure A.12: M0 decomposition by subgroup, Age group contribution
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Figure A.13: Multidimensional Poverty 1990-2013 by Ethnicity
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
Figure A.14: M0 decomposition by subgroup, Ethnicity contribution
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Table A.19: Percentage of Indigenous people by Region and Year *
Region 1996 2000 2003 2006 2009 2011 2013
I 9.91% 14.75% 13.42% 17.13% 12.60% 16.35% 17.98%
II 2.65% 2.26% 4.51% 7.42% 5.70% 7.54% 9.15%
III 2.38% 0.67% 2.13% 4.36% 7.52% 10.35% 14.80%
IV 0.54% 1.03% 1.26% 1.67% 1.74% 2.67% 4.57%
V 1.47% 0.65% 1.14% 2.15% 3.20% 3.11% 3.16%
VI 1.31% 0.70% 1.10% 1.30% 1.90% 4.02% 3.41%
VII 0.45% 1.01% 1.44% 1.52% 1.61% 2.31% 2.20%
VIII 2.95% 3.06% 2.29% 3.94% 3.87% 5.21% 5.43%
IX 18.03% 25.61% 30.21% 27.76% 30.08% 32.08% 32.28%
X 10.27% 9.04% 14.61% 18.53% 20.84% 23.69% 24.88%
XI 6.59% 8.17% 13.65% 12.53% 21.76% 23.71% 26.56%
XII 3.96% 6.30% 10.63% 15.39% 22.69% 20.58% 20.22%
R.M. 2.28% 2.71% 3.16% 4.38% 4.08% 4.97% 7.28%
XIV - - - - 16.73% 18.69% 22.23%
XV - - - - 25.43% 26.35% 31.74%
*Regions XIV and XV were created in 2007
Source: Own elaboration with Casen
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Figure A.15: Multidimensional Poverty 1990-2013 by Region
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Figure A.16: M0 decomposition by subgroup, Regions
*
*Regions XIV and XV were created in 2007
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Figure A.17: Multidimensional Poverty 1990-2013, Dimensions Contributions
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
Figure A.18: Multidimensional Poverty 1990-2013, Sub-dimensions Contributions
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Figure A.19: Schooling by Income Quantile
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Figure A.20: Concentration curve of Schooling
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Table A.20: Education Inequality by Schooling *
Year Zone Mean Gini
Country 8.95 0.275
1990 Urban 9.42 0.257
Rural 6.32 0.320
Country 8.99 0.270
1992 Urban 9.46 0.252
Rural 6.20 0.318
Country 9.05 0.273
1994 Urban 9.47 0.258
Rural 6.45 0.312
Country 9.38 0.262
1996 Urban 9.89 0.242
Rural 5.94 0.308
Country 9.65 0.257
1998 Urban 10.14 0.237
Rural 6.15 0.306
Country 9.85 0.251
2000 Urban 10.33 0.232
Rural 6.30 0.302
Country 10.03 0.248
2003 Urban 10.50 0.230
Rural 6.57 0.297
Country 9.83 0.249
2006 Urban 10.23 0.234
Rural 6.98 0.293
Country 10.19 0.236
2009 Urban 10.57 0.222
Rural 7.48 0.287
Country 10.27 0.233
2011 Urban 10.65 0.220
Rural 7.58 0.279
Country 10.58 0.228
2013 Urban 11.02 0.213
Rural 7.65 0.281
* Estimation by Head of the household
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
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Figure A.21: Concentration curve of Health insurance
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Figure A.22: Concentration curve of Life insurance
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Table A.21: Social Security and Employment Inequality *
Year Zone Mean Gini
Country 0.887 0.098
1990 Urban 0.897 0.091
Rural 0.836 0.132
Country 0.863 0.116
1992 Urban 0.872 0.109
Rural 0.814 0.144
Country 0.864 0.115
1994 Urban 0.872 0.109
Rural 0.818 0.143
Country 0.863 0.115
1996 Urban 0.873 0.108
Rural 0.804 0.150
Country 0.857 0.119
1998 Urban 0.868 0.112
Rural 0.794 0.155
Country 0.860 0.117
2000 Urban 0.867 0.113
Rural 0.817 0.144
Country 0.898 0.090
2003 Urban 0.904 0.085
Rural 0.857 0.120
Country 0.899 0.089
2006 Urban 0.903 0.086
Rural 0.869 0.112
Country 0.894 0.093
2009 Urban 0.897 0.091
Rural 0.873 0.108
Country 0.887 0.098
2011 Urban 0.891 0.095
Rural 0.860 0.117
Country 0.874 0.108
2013 Urban 0.879 0.105
Rural 0.841 0.129
* Social Security and employment index based on
employment condition, life insurance, and pension range 0-1
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
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Figure A.23: Concentration curve of Dwelling characteristics
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Table A.22: Living Standards Inequality *
Year Zone Mean Gini
Country 0.845 0.125
1990 Urban 0.883 0.097
Rural 0.657 0.202
Country 0.860 0.110
1992 Urban 0.896 0.084
Rural 0.670 0.193
Country 0.865 0.109
1994 Urban 0.899 0.084
Rural 0.679 0.196
Country 0.885 0.096
1996 Urban 0.919 0.069
Rural 0.679 0.195
Country 0.897 0.086
1998 Urban 0.928 0.061
Rural 0.700 0.182
Country 0.911 0.075
2000 Urban 0.940 0.052
Rural 0.726 0.174
Country 0.914 0.071
2003 Urban 0.936 0.054
Rural 0.767 0.151
Country 0.914 0.070
2006 Urban 0.932 0.056
Rural 0.797 0.141
Country 0.922 0.064
2009 Urban 0.936 0.053
Rural 0.827 0.125
Country 0.937 0.052
2011 Urban 0.949 0.042
Rural 0.857 0.102
Country 0.951 0.042
2013 Urban 0.960 0.034
Rural 0.888 0.085
* Estimations based on quality and access index, range 0-1
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
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Table A.23: Multidimensional Inequality by Maasoumi
β = −30 β = 0 β = 1
Year A(0.5) A(1) A(2) A(0.5) A(1) A(2) A(0.5) A(1) A(2)
1990 0.060 0.129 0.293 0.393 0.616 0.580 0.027 0.059 0.136
1992 0.057 0.124 0.285 0.375 0.567 0.532 0.025 0.055 0.124
1994 0.066 0.139 0.303 0.164 0.156 0.125 0.010 0.021 0.047
1996 0.063 0.136 0.310 0.187 0.190 0.158 0.011 0.024 0.055
1998 0.060 0.129 0.297 0.197 0.206 0.176 0.012 0.025 0.057
2000 0.058 0.127 0.296 0.178 0.181 0.153 0.011 0.023 0.052
2003 0.057 0.125 0.293 0.149 0.145 0.121 0.008 0.017 0.038
2006 0.057 0.125 0.294 0.117 0.103 0.080 0.006 0.013 0.300
2009 0.051 0.113 0.268 0.113 0.098 0.076 0.006 0.012 0.027
2011 0.050 0.108 0.259 0.088 0.075 0.050 0.005 0.010 0.023
2013 0.049 0.107 0.261 0.089 0.070 0.049 0.005 0.011 0.023
Note: Dimensions are equally weighted to be consistent with MPI
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
Table A.24: Multidimensional Inequality by Bourguignon
β = −30 β = 0 β = 1
Year A(0.5) A(1) A(2) A(0.5) A(1) A(2) A(0.5) A(1) A(2)
1990 0.027 0.126 0.528 0.340 0.283 0.135 0.013 0.000 0.093
1992 0.020 0.108 0.468 0.324 0.269 0.128 0.013 0.000 0.088
1994 0.028 0.012 0.266 0.153 0.142 0.093 0.005 0.000 0.037
1996 0.016 0.033 0.298 0.171 0.154 0.095 0.005 0.000 0.040
1998 0.016 0.030 0.278 0.178 0.160 0.097 0.006 0.000 0.042
2000 0.020 0.021 0.249 0.161 0.145 0.089 0.005 0.000 0.038
2003 0.018 0.024 0.252 0.139 0.128 0.086 0.004 0.000 0.028
2006 0.019 0.022 0.248 0.111 0.106 0.074 0.003 0.000 0.023
2009 0.023 0.006 0.189 0.108 0.103 0.073 0.003 0.000 0.022
2011 0.022 0.006 0.181 0.086 0.084 0.060 0.002 0.000 0.019
2013 0.024 0.002 0.167 0.086 0.084 0.059 0.002 0.000 0.019
Note: Dimensions are equally weighted to be consistent with MPI
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
APPENDIX A. ANNEX 74
Figure A.24: Multidimensional inequality in Chile
Maasoumi and Bourguignon Indexes
Education, Health, Social Security and Living Standards
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Table A.25: Poverty after Tax Simulation
Year Zone FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Popshare
Country 0.383 0.123 0.052 100%
1990 Urban 0.382 0.130 0.056 83%
Rural 0.386 0.090 0.029 17%
Country 0.325 0.092 0.035 100%
1992 Urban 0.324 0.099 0.039 84%
Rural 0.332 0.058 0.016 16%
Country 0.270 0.076 0.030 100%
1994 Urban 0.268 0.081 0.033 84%
Rural 0.283 0.051 0.016 16%
Country 0.222 0.058 0.021 100%
1996 Urban 0.219 0.060 0.023 85%
Rural 0.238 0.043 0.014 15%
Country 0.201 0.049 0.017 100%
1998 Urban 0.205 0.053 0.019 86%
Rural 0.172 0.026 0.007 14%
Country 0.193 0.056 0.024 100%
2000 Urban 0.195 0.057 0.024 86%
Rural 0.180 0.046 0.019 14%
Country 0.173 0.044 0.016 100%
2003 Urban 0.184 0.046 0.017 87%
Rural 0.103 0.024 0.009 13%
Country 0.129 0.026 0.010 100%
2006 Urban 0.139 0.028 0.010 87%
Rural 0.062 0.014 0.005 13%
Country 0.145 0.037 0.016 100%
2009 Urban 0.154 0.039 0.017 87%
Rural 0.084 0.025 0.011 13%
Country 0.131 0.024 0.008 100%
2011 Urban 0.144 0.026 0.008 87%
Rural 0.043 0.011 0.004 13%
Country 0.173 0.045 0.017 100%
2013* Urban 0.181 0.046 0.018 87%
Rural 0.116 0.036 0.016 13%
Note: Estimations based en Percapita Income after taxes and subsidy
* In 2013 the Income adjustment are do it by Panel Casen instead of ECLAC
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
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Table A.26: Inequality after Tax Simulation
Year Zone GE(0) GE(1) Gini Popshare
Country 0.514 0.651 0.549 100%
1990 Urban 0.498 0.612 0.540 83%
Rural 0.546 0.864 0.564 17%
Country 0.508 0.644 0.546 100%
1992 Urban 0.507 0.630 0.545 84%
Rural 0.395 0.604 0.485 16%
Country 0.525 0.731 0.550 100%
1994 Urban 0.519 0.719 0.546 84%
Rural 0.394 0.606 0.483 16%
Country 0.512 0.618 0.545 100%
1996 Urban 0.502 0.599 0.539 85%
Rural 0.352 0.497 0.459 15%
Country 0.531 0.652 0.555 100%
1998 Urban 0.523 0.631 0.550 86%
Rural 0.356 0.553 0.461 14%
Country 0.559 0.681 0.564 100%
2000 Urban 0.550 0.661 0.559 86%
Rural 0.420 0.642 0.495 14%
Country 0.510 0.662 0.544 100%
2003 Urban 0.506 0.651 0.541 87%
Rural 0.394 0.586 0.483 13%
Country 0.458 0.565 0.518 100%
2006 Urban 0.453 0.551 0.514 87%
Rural 0.411 0.601 0.493 13%
Country 0.468 0.583 0.520 100%
2009 Urban 0.470 0.581 0.521 87%
Rural 0.348 0.454 0.452 13%
Country 0.427 0.525 0.504 100%
2011 Urban 0.429 0.519 0.505 87%
Rural 0.346 0.487 0.454 13%
Country 0.417 0.491 0.494 100%
2013* Urban 0.413 0.484 0.492 87%
Rural 0.332 0.426 0.442 13%
Note: Estimations based en Percapita Income after taxes and subsidy
* In 2013 the Income adjustment are do it by Panel Casen instead of ECLAC
Source: Own elaboration with Casen Data
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Figure A.25: Multidimensional Poverty by Zone after Educational Reform
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
Figure A.26: M0 decomposition by Zone after Educational Reform
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
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Figure A.27: Multidimensional Poverty by Zone after Health Reform
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
Figure A.28: M0 decomposition by Zone after Health Reform
Source: Own elaboration with Casen data
